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Environmental Soft Loan Program in Asian Countries: Industrial Pollution 
Control or Mal-use of Foreign Aid Resources? 
 
ABSTRACT: 
Several Asian countries have tried to establish environmental soft loan program as a measure 
for industrial pollution control, with financial and technical assistances from Asian Development 
Bank, Germany and Japan.  However, the program may contradicts with OECD’s Polluter Pays 
Principle and may result in inefficient allocation of foreign aid, and may disturb financial market 
development. 
This article examines conditions and context that environmental soft loan program can be 
justified from theoretical arguments and a case study of Japan.  Then, it tries to clarify how the 
recipient countries satisfied the above conditions and contexts through comparative analysis of 
the program in Indonesia, Thailand, China, the Philippines and Sri Lanka.  We’ll show that the 
required conditions and contexts are so severe that only the Philippines could satisfy them, 
mainly due to mission, impartiality and competency of the Development Bank of the Philippines, 
as well as availability of environmental technologies and competent consultants. 
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International institutions have provided various kinds of financial instruments for the 
environment in developing countries.  Soft loan is one of these instruments1.  It is defined as 
loan at conditions more favorable for the borrowers than loans at market conditions (Schemidt 
[1]). 
Japan (Japan Bank for International Cooperation, JBIC) and Germany (Kreditanstalf fur 
Wiederaufbau, KfW) have provided environmental aid to establish environmental soft loan 
program in East and South Asia (Table 1).  The program aimed for offering subsidized loan to 
pollution sources, especially industrial factories to improve the environment though emissions 
reduction and/or efficient use of resources.  Banks, mostly government ones, are appointed to 
allocate, manage and revolve the fund, because they have much experiences of policy-based 
lending.  They are expected to find much more customers with less cost than the government 
through their business network. 
After a decade of experience, we can now see the differences in the sustainability of the 
programs:  The Philippines continued the program and developed it at the second phase, while 
China replaced it with direct provision in the preparation phase, and Indonesia and Thailand 
cancelled the second phase of the JBIC’s assistance program.  We can also see the differences 
of the environmental and financial performance in the sub-projects:  Some sub-projects had 
significant impacts on the emission reduction and/or efficient use of resources, while others 
faced default of borrowers and no significant impact on emission reduction. 
Donors as well as several independent researchers have made post-completion evaluation.  
JBIC [2] evaluates its environmental soft loan program in Indonesia, Sasaki, Hayashi and Takagi 
[3] in Thailand, KfW [4] and Tsubosato [5] does its program in the Philippines and KfW [6] in 
Sri Lanka.  All of them focus on the each program to evaluate it in view of the five indicators 
that Development Assistance Committee has recommended: relevancy, efficiency, effectiveness, 
impact (significance), and sustainability.  We can find some common factors that brought the 
program to fall down, such as the Asian economic crisis.  But they have made little, if any 
reference to the theoretical arguments and comparative analysis.  They have not answered to 
such general questions as: when and where the environmental soft loan program really works for 
emission reduction and efficient use of resources, and why we can see the differences in the 
performance among recipient countries. 
This article has two purposes.  First, it aims to draw the conditions and contexts that the 
environmental soft loan program is justified from theoretical arguments and a case study of 
Japan.  Second, it tries to clarify how the recipient countries satisfied the above conditions and 
                                                 
1 Another instruments are grants, credits, hard loans, venture capital and equity. 
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contexts by making comparative analysis of the environmental soft loan program in Indonesia, 
Thailand, China, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. 
 
 
2. Evaluation Framework for Environmental Soft Loan Program 
2.1 When environmental soft loan Is justified? Theoretical arguments 
Environmental soft loan can be recognized as a type of government subsidy.  Theoretically, 
government subsidy can be justified for it can internalize the negative externalities caused by 
emission.  Like as the Pigouvian Tax, it helps achieve the efficient level of emission in the short 
term when it is provided in accordance with emission reduction.  It also help achieve efficient 
level of emission in the long-term when (a) fixed cost is large enough to offset the subsidy, (b) 
emission standard can adjust to the level where firms can earn a profit from subsidy, (c) subsidy 
has remarkable impacts on firms’ technological innovation and diffusion activities that bring 
emission reduction (Lee [7]).  Subsidy gives strong incentive for innovation and diffusion of 
environmental technologies when it is packaged with other environmental policy instruments 
such as command-and-control and environmental tax.  Environmental soft loan is expected to 
have the same impacts as the subsidy that is provided in accordance with emission reduction, 
though they are legally different in a strict sense. 
Market failure is another reason environmental soft loan can be justified.  Firms may face 
three types of market failures on environmental technology.  Firstly, they often cannot access to 
the information on environmental technology and hesitate to make decision on investment.  
Secondly, there occurs agency problem within a firm and firm’s investing department do not like 
to decide cost-saving investment because it does not enjoy profits from cost-savings accrued to 
that investment.  Lastly, capital market does not work efficiently, for financial institutions rarely 
have much information for SMEs, and rarely recognize that the environment is an attractive field 
of investment (Jaffe and Stavins [8]; Jaffe, Newell and Stavins [9]).  Through demonstration 
effects, environmental soft loan program may diffuse opportunities and knowledge to other 
financial institutions, which may start the same program in their own accounts.  This can 
happen especially when several financial institutions are involved in the program.  In the 
process, they may find new customer groups, which may help develop the capital market.  In 
addition, firms should take performance risk of environmental technology, and risk of the 
adverse impact on quality of their products when they invest it on (Belis-Bergouignan et al. [10]; 
Verheul [11]).  In these cases, government subsidy may reduce the risk firms may face and 
encourage them to make investment. 
However, these advantages cannot be realized without costs.  Environmental soft loan, and 
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government subsidy in general, contradicts with the Polluter-Pays Principle.  It has the opposite 
distributional result to the Pigouvian Tax that environmentalist and victims hardly accept.  It 
also will distort resource allocation in the capital market, choice of environmental technology, 
investment decision and international trade (OECD [12]).  This occurs especially when real 
interest rate is negative.  In addition, it may suffer from moral hazard that arises from 
ineffective emission reduction (Kemp [13]):  Government can make only incomplete 
monitoring on what kind of activities firms spend after it has provided subsidies.  The cost of 
government failure may become bigger than that of missing market when the government cannot 
play this role. 
 
2.2 Japan’s experience as a referential point 
Japan is said to provide environmental soft loan for industrial pollution most extensively in 
the world.  JBIC referred to the “success” of Japan’s experience on the industrial pollution 
control in the 1970s when it initiated foreign aid program on the environmental soft loan 
(Konishi [14]).  Japan’s experience tells us that market failure and establishment of stringent 
regulations do not automatically justify environmental soft loan: instead, there are several 
conditions and contexts that environmental soft loan program can be justified (Mori, Lee and 
Ueta [15]): 
 
(a) Environmental soft loan program is integrated into stringent environmental policy and 
strict enforcement, and it employs some measures to minimize moral hazard on the part 
of firms, such as establishment and diffusion of technical standards.  These measures 
can enhance the effectiveness of emission reduction when the government and handling 
banks have enough knowledge and competence for collecting and evaluating 
performance and cost of environmental technologies.  However, inappropriate technical 
standard will make firms choose less cost-effective ones, which raised default risk. 
(b) Terms of conditions, especially interest rate to potential borrowers is determined so as 
not to impair both attractiveness to firms and efficiency in resource allocation.  More 
concessional terms of condition will attract many customers, but cause inefficient 
allocation in the capital market when the real interest rate is negative. 
(c) The above inefficiency in resource allocation can be overweighed by the benefits of 
financial market development.  To realize this benefit, handling banks should have 
enough competence in appraisal and monitoring in terms of financial soundness and 
environmental impact and cost of the technology.  The government and consultants 
may help them to acquire it in case they do not have.  In addition, the government 
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should establish a mechanism that can effectively monitor, manage, and channel the 
revolving fund, or the amount of repayment from borrowers.  But it may increase 
inefficient investment or ineffective use of financial resources when the lending rate in 
the market becomes lower. 
 
We can correspond to the above points to effectiveness, efficiency and impact in the DAC’s 
evaluation indicators.  In this sense, this article can be said to make de facto ex-post evaluation 
of the environmental soft loan program with comparative analysis of the experiences in Asia. 
 
 
3. Environmental Soft Loan Programs in Asia 
3.1 Background 
3.1.1 Environmental regulations 
All the recipients tried to take more stringent environmental measures before Japan and/or 
Germany provided foreign aid.  Some enacted new laws and regulations, and set up new 
ministry to enhance enforcement, while others created new measures without legal support. 
China enacted the second version of the Air Pollution Control Act in 1995.  It allowed the 
State Council to cordon off regions in which acid rain or sulfur emissions were most serious and 
in which the sternest emissions reduction measures needed to be implemented (Zusman and 
Turner [16]).  This provision led to the plan that created the Acid Rain Control Zone and the 
Sulfur Dioxide Control Zone in 1998, and the total pollutants emission control in the 10th 
five-year plan.  In addition, it published the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) and the 
Long-Term Development Goal (1996-2010) to establish stricter deadlines for environmental 
regulation and enforcement. 
With the disappointing experience with its EIA-based environmental strategy (Rock [17]), 
Indonesia started the Clean Water Program (PROKASIH) in 1989 in order to reduce the amount 
of pollutants discharged from firms along the most polluted rivers.  The target was gradually 
expanded in terms of provinces and firms.  Participating provinces increased from eight in 1989 
to seventeen in 1995, and number of firms attained to 1900 in 1994.  In 1990, two years before 
the JBIC assisted environmental soft loan program, the Environmental Impact Management 
Agency (Bapedal) was established to manage this program as well as environmental impact 
assessment.  With the success of the PROKASIH, the Bapedal launched an environmental 
rating and public disclosure program called PROPER PROKASIH in 1995.  It had suspended 
the program in the confusion of economic and political crisis, but started again in 2004. 
Thailand enacted the National Environmental Quality Act (NEQA) 1992 to create the 
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comprehensive environmental framework law.  NEQA 1992 restructured the Ministry of 
Science, Technology and Environment to establish three new departments: the Pollution Control 
Department (PCD), the Office of Environmental Policy and Planning (OEPP), and the 
Department of Environmental Quality Promotion (DEQP).  The PCD acquired the authority to 
require firms to install pollution control technology and to impose more stringent standards than 
the Department of Industrial Works (DIW), though the latter also had the authority to enforce 
laws and regulations under the Factory Control Act. 
Though the Philippines has yet legislated the comprehensive environmental framework law, 
the Department of Environment and Natural Resource gradually tightened up environmental 
regulations that approval of the Congress was not required.  The Environmental Impact 
Statement System was revised in 1992, 1996, 2002 and 2003 to publish detailed procedures and 
rationalize them after the establishment in 1978 as a presidential decree.  It made the Mid-term 
Development Plan (1993-98) where industrial pollution control was picked up as one of the 
focuses.  It also set up effluent standard in 1995, and gave the Lake Laguna Development 
Authority (LLDA) the authority to charge environmental users fee for firms to improve the water 
quality of the most polluted lake: the Laguna de Bay. 
These more stringent environmental measures were expected to increase demand for 
environmental technologies, and thus environmental soft loans (JBIC [2]). 
 
3.1.2 Financial institutions 
Japan and Germany chose these five Asian countries –China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri 
Lanka and Thailand-- not only by the seriousness of the industrial pollution, but also by the 
existence of government financial institutions that had made policy-based loans.  This 
institutional precondition was critical for Germany, because it attached more importance on 
deepening and broadening of the financial sector by introducing new financial products (KfW 
[18]). 
Where the government had the government development bank, they appointed it as a 
handling bank of the environmental soft loan program.  Both donors appointed the 
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in the Philippines, and the National Development 
Bank (NDB) in Sri Lanka.  To create demand, both donors appointed them as apex banks and 
added several private banks as handling banks.  The Industrial Financial Corporation of 
Thailand (IFCT) was appointed as the only handling bank for the Japan’s aid program in 
Thailand, as well as the World Bank’s ones. 
However, there was no such bank in Indonesia.  Moreover, each commercial bank, 
regardless of private or governmental, preferred to finance for their affiliated firms.  To provide 
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loans to as many customers, it had no choice but to appoint several state and private commercial 
banks for the JBIC’s program, and several regional development banks for KfW’s program. 
China had several government special purpose banks, including the China Development 
Bank and the Export and Import Bank of China (EXIM).  The KfW appointed one state 
commercial bank, the Agricultural Bank of China as a handling bank in the first phase, and the 
China Minchan Bank at the second phase.  The JBIC, on the other hand, appointed the EXIM as 
the handling bank in the Environmental Package Loan (EPL). 
 
3.2 Emission reduction: Environmental policy- soft loan package? 
In the Environmental Protection Promotion Plan (EPPP) I in Thailand, total amount of BOD 
reduction was estimated to 3,369 ton (Sasaki, Hayashi and Takagi [3]).  Sasaki, Hayashi and 
Takagi [3] evaluated that firms chose appropriate pollution control technology, even though there 
was no established technical standard for environmental technologies and the IFCT had little, if 
any capacity for technical appraisal.  This was because the JBIC limited the eligible technology 
to the proven end-of-pipe ones, and requested the IFCT to submit the project proposals to the 
JBIC for appraisal at the outset.  To respond, only firms that could afford to hire internationally 
qualified consultant submitted the loan application.  This minimized the moral hazard on the 
part of firms, at the cost of reduced number of application. 
Even so, actual amount of emission reduction might be smaller than the Sasaki, Hayashi and 
Takagi’s estimation for at least two reasons.  Firstly, it has not created the legislative or 
institutional framework to successfully monitor and enforce emission regulations on point 
sources of pollution.  The Ministry of Industry, that took charge of factory control, was passive 
in enforcing environmental regulations.  Provincial and local governments had no authority and 
resources to control industrial pollution.  There could be hardly seen any efforts for packaging 
stringent environmental policies and soft loan.  Secondly, Thailand suffered from the economic 
crisis during 1997-2000.  Six out of eight borrowers went through restructuring in 2002, and 
could not afford to finance even operational and maintenance cost of pollution control 
technologies they had invested on. 
In the AJDF/B3 in Indonesia, impact on the emission reduction was mixed:  Some firms 
spent the loan to install pollution control technology and reduced emission reduction, while 
others converted the obtained loan to expand production capacity with no impact on emission 
reduction2.  The other firms spent it for the development of latest pollution control technology, 
                                                 
2 Up to 1999, the Bapedal found seven cases of diversion out of seventy end-users (Bank 
Indonesia [23]). This happened partly due to the lack of post monitoring capacity and partly due 
to the lack of penalty. 
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but failed to install and faced default risk. 
There are at least two reasons for the ineffectiveness.  As in Thailand, there was no 
technical standard, and both the Bapedal and firms could hardly make technical appraisal and its 
cost.  Both of them preferred end-of-pipe technology to avoid moral hazard of firms because 
performance and cost were deemed proven.  However, the Bapedal obtained too small resources 
to make strict enforcement and inspection.  Provincial governments had no authority and 
capacity to enforce environmental regulations and inspection to firms that were outside the 
PROKASIH, even if they were urged to solve pollution problems by residents and NGOs3.  
Under such a weak inspection capacity and authority, firms had strong incentive to cheat the 
government to divert the loan.  In addition, there were few internationally qualified consultants.  
If there was, most of the firms were not afford to hire them.  Some big, leading firms had 
incentive to develop to install most advanced cleaner production technology so that they could 
show that the technology would make firms comply with the regulations and bring them profit.  
But as they happened to hire poorly qualified consultant, they suffered from mal-performance of 
the technology, and failed to reduce emission. 
China tried to ensure the effectiveness through the government direct involvement in the EPL.  
Based on the Long-term Environmental Action Plan, the central government chose the projects 
in the heavily polluting areas and/or that brought significant environmental improvements.  
However, most of local governments were reluctant to enforce environmental policies strictly, 
and technical standard was not established and diffused widespread.  Besides local 
environmental infrastructure such as central heating system and the extension of natural gas 
pipeline, neither firms nor local governments had strong incentive to spend the loan in the same 
way as planned.  The central government rarely enforced sanction. 
However, we can find several cases that environmental soft loan reduced emissions 
significantly.  The first case is when firms invest on new plants that had to comply with the 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) requirements.  Firms might save costs when compared 
to installing environmental technologies to the existing plants because they could adjust 
production process in the preparation stage.  Compliance made it easier for firms to convince 
nearby residents who were anxious about environmental damages, thus enabled them to save 
significant amount of time and cost.  The AJDF/B3 and the EPPP provided firms with an 
opportunity to reduce compliance and convincement cost further, and to enhance competitive 
advantage. 
                                                 
3 Even the success of PROKASIH and PROPER depended on creating at least minimum levels 
of technical capability in a national environmental agency and on attracting the right people who 
responded to the information on emission (Rock [17]). 
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The second case is when and where emission reduction enhanced their reputation for 
customers.  Hospital was one typical example.  In Indonesia, the government had established 
regulations to require hospitals for proper management and disposal of waste for hygienic reason, 
and awarded good rating for those that proved good management.  The Industrial Pollution 
Control Credit (IPCC) Program has enabled hospitals to improve waste management by 
providing both soft loan and consultant fee for technical advices4. 
The Philippines and Sri Lanka had more or less better effectiveness, because the handling 
banks required firms to obtain Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) (in the Philippines) 
or Environmental Protection License (EPL) (in Sri Lanka).  Though this requirement limited 
the applicants to new plants, it broadened the range of potential customers because almost all the 
projects had some environmental component.  In the Philippines, the government granted ECC 
to firms when it admitted that proposed projects would not cause significant negative impact by 
reviewing environmental impact statement.  ECC-granted firms should submit the 
environmental statement and environmental performance monitoring report regularly.  With the 
assistance of technical consultants, the DBP enhanced the competence to review environmental 
impact statements and to monitor ex-post environmental performance of the borrowers.  In this 
sense, the DBP carried out the same regulatory enforcement function as the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)5.  In addition, the DBP published several studies 
and guidelines on environmental monitoring and technologies so that firms could use in planning 
projects.  It distributed them widely to firms through seminars and workshops for industrial 
association.  The range of technologies was broadened to include cleaner production as well as 
end-of-pipe, for the Industrial Pollution Control Programs I and II and the Environmental 
Infrastructure Support Credit Program (EISCP) II allowed firms to invest on both types of 
technologies.  These measures have enabled the DBP to minimize moral hazard on the part of 
firms, though submitted monitoring data were incomplete and the environmental parameters 
were not always appropriate (Development Bank of the Philippines [19])6. 
In the NDB Small Loan Programme in Sri Lanka, all the soft loans were flanked with 
technical advice to assist firms in planning and implementing environmental investments.  As a 
                                                 
4 Hospitals had second largest share in the KfW’s Industrial Pollution Control Credit Program, 
followed by recycling sector in 2002. 
5 Local government has small resources for managing the environment, despite of the relative 
large authority delegated in the decentralization process.  In addition, political appointee has 
made it difficult for them to accumulate the competence and knowledge in organizations. 
6 The DBP suffered from default of customers and non-performing loans.  Four out of twenty 
seven borrowers could not repay the loan in the Industrial Pollution Control Program and three 
out of twenty-one in the Environmental Infrastructure Support Credit Program.  But according 
to the officials of the DMP, this figure is lower than the average of all the lending. 
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result of soft loan-technical advice package, all the borrowers obtained the EPL through the 
investment (KfW, [6]). 
 
3.3 Capital market distortion 
All the recipient countries succeeded in disbursing the fund at the first phase of the program.  
However, a clear difference turned up in the period by which disbursement had been completed.  
Thailand allocated the fund only to eight firms, and the amount of disbursement was only 
two-third of the fund in the Environmental Protection Promotion Plan.  Indonesia allocated it to 
seventy firms within 5 years but had to wait another years to disburse all of it in the ADJF/B3.  
These two programs had been to be expanded in the second phase, but was cancelled due to the 
low/ slow disbursement.  Sri Lanka and Indonesia had disbursed the fund faster than expected 
in the first phase, but suffered from slow disbursement in the second phase.  Asian economic 
crisis is a significant external factor, but there are several non-negligible internal factors: terms of 
conditions, especially interest rate. 
The KfW employed the fixed rate, and determined the rate so as not to be negative in real 
term.  With the pegging of the pass-through rates, the lending interest rate could be higher than 
the one in the domestic market, which impaired favorable terms of condition of the 
environmental soft loan.  In China, the market interest rate decreased in the second phase, 
which reduced demand for the environmental soft loan.  In response, the KfW decided to drop 
the environmental requirement and shifted its focus on financing for SMEs development.  In Sri 
Lanka, the KfW’s loan program lost the competitiveness when compared to the one of JBIC 
because it kept the real lending rate positive while the negative in real term in JBIC’s program 
when inflation rate got higher.  The amount disbursed from the fund reduced to two-thirds of 
the initial plan in the second phase while 100% in the first phase (KfW [6]). 
The JBIC, on the other hand, applied the fixed rate to all the recipients but Indonesia.  The 
rate was determined with little consideration to market distortion.  It was determined at 
8.5-13% so that the lending rate was several percent lower than offered in the market (Table 2). 
Even so, it lost competitiveness in terms of condition against the domestic capital market 
after the economic crisis in Thailand.  After the crisis, the Thai government lowered the official 
discount rate, and accordingly interest rate in the domestic market became lower than the one of 
the environmental soft loan.  The IFCT, however, were unwilling to lower the lending rate of 
the soft loan because it would reduce earnings from the spread, the main source of their profit.  
In Indonesia, the government took the foreign exchange risk.  It enabled handling banks to 
provide the loan at the same rate as the central bank bond (SBI) interest rate even after they had 
secured a 5% interest spread for each loan.  This measure might convince many handling banks 
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to join in the program.  However, it could increase the number of default case during the 
economic crisis because the interest rate jumped up to more than 40%, which doubled or tripled 
the firms’ debt burden. 
In the Philippines, the DBP set a fixed interest rate.  The real interest rate did not become 
negative even when the Philippines suffered from increase in the interest rate. 
 
3.4 Impact on financial market development 
In the EPPP I in Thailand, the IFCT was the only handling bank, but was reluctant to provide 
sub-loans to firms.  The IFCT had obtained no information on potential customers, including 
type of industry and areas.  The government had few, if any information, and could not give it 
to the IFCT.  What the IFCT did was just to distribute leaflets to the existing customers and 
waited them to come. 
In addition, the IFCT was obliged to provide collaterals to prepare for firms’ default cases.  
The government burdened it in other countries, but the Thai government claimed it would not 
offer guarantees for state bank’s foreign borrowing any more.  Moreover, it required the IFCT 
to be financially independent from the government.  This drove the IFCT to earn a high spread 
from each soft loan program it received from foreign donors, instead of increasing the amount of 
environmental lending.  It disbursed only the large-size, existing customers.  The number of 
borrowers was smallest among the recipients.  This signifies there can be seen no impact of 
financial deepening. 
In the AJDF/B3 in Indonesia, nine commercial banks were appointed as handling banks and 
the central bank was expected to function as apex bank.  With training by technical consultants, 
they gradually understood the function and their role in the environmental soft loan program.  
Some of them became proactive in providing it and tried to find out new customers, including 
SMEs.  However, the change in the central bank’s function discouraged them to provide 
additional loans.  After the crisis, the central government stopped direct lending to firms and 
limited its function to control the financial market.  The environmental soft loan program lost 
the apex bank that was expected to manage and monitor the revolving fund covering all the 
handling banks.  Due to the loss of channeling mechanism of the repayment to other banks, 
each handling bank had to establish its own revolving fund in its account.  But disbursement to 
each handling bank, thus the amount of revolving fund was uneven because the fund was 
allocated according to “first come, first served” principle at the outset.  As a result, some 
handling banks faced excessive demand while other banks had too much amount of revolving 
fund to re-disburse7.  In the sub-loan agreement, the government put 2% charges for revolving 
                                                 
7 Most of the private banks and their affiliated firms are set up by Indonesian Chinese, which 
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fund when it found the fund was not used for proper purpose or it was left unspent.  This 
discouraged both sides of the banks to continue the loan.  Handling banks lost an opportunity to 
obtain new customers and SMEs.  The AJDF/B3 has brought Indonesia financial broadening 
and deepening only slightly, if any. 
In the Industrial Pollution Control Credit in Indonesia, the KfW required handling banks to 
limit the target to exiting plants.  It also requested borrowers to hire technical consultant to 
minimize technical and default risk.  To respond the demand, some handling banks offered 
loans to new customers and new industry such as recycling.  Most of existing and new 
customers were SMEs that had difficulty in obtaining bank loans due to shortage of collateral.  
This has slightly broadened the market for environmental lending, but some of them faced 
default cases.  As for the revolving fund, it was not worked effectively.  The Bank Export 
Indonesia was appointed as apex bank, because it provided export credit for SMEs to expand 
their export under the control of the Ministry of Finance.  However, the Ministry of Finance 
gradually shifted the priority from the development of financial institutions to sound fiscal 
management, and did not cooperate to enhance revolving function. 
In the Environmental Package Loan in China, the EXIM was appointed as a handing bank, 
but could not decide which firms it provided environmental soft loan: the State Environmental 
Protection Agency (SEPA) and the State Development and Reform Committee (SDRC) decided 
the allocation without appraising firms’ financial soundness.  They wanted to intervene to the 
fund allocation when the loan would be disbursed from the revolving fund.  The JBIC finally 
decided to replace it with the “normal” environmental aid projects for industrial pollution control 
(Mori [20])8. 
In the NDB Small Loan Programme in Sri Lanka, the NDB was appointed as both handling 
bank and apex bank, and four conduit banks were also appointed as handling banks.  
Participation of four conduit banks broadened the range of customers, and increased the number 
and amount of disbursement.  But there were no lending from the revolving fund, because 
quality of the loan portfolio was deteriorating and demand for the fund was sluggish9. 
The Philippines has gained a better impact on financial deepening.  The DBP, the only 
handling bank for the Industrial Pollution Control Program I and II and Environmental 
                                                                                                                                                             
occupies large share in the economic activities. The government banks prefer lending to local 
Indonesian firms so that they could be competitive to Chinese firms. 
8 Provincial and local governments guaranteed the default risk, because they were devolved 
greater authority from the central government, and thus were regarded as those who 
implemented environmental projects. 
9 With the pegging of the pass-through rates, the project appraisal explicitly assumed fund 
depreciation.  At relatively long terms up to seven years, the indexed interest rates for final 
borrowers also impair value maintenance (KfW [6]). 
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Infrastructure Support Credit Program I, was very proactive in leading not only the 
environmental soft loan but also the environmental initiatives of the Philippines industries.  It 
held training programs and seminars for potential customers as well as officials of its regional 
branch to expand the type of industries and the number of regions for environmental lending.  
However, only sixteen out of seventy-seven local branches had obtained enough capacity for 
environmental lending.  Then it invited five commercial banks to be handling banks for the 
EISCP II, and took the function of apex bank.  These commercial banks joined it because the 
DBP had demonstrated the potential profitability of environmental lending, and offered a 
favorable terms of condition to them.  They not only disbursed loans to exiting customers but 
found out new ones to take gain more profit from the spread.  In addition, the revolving fund 
has worked well in terms of both financial disbursement and emission reduction.  The DBP was 




4. Why Only Few Countries Have Gained? 
Why has only few countries succeeded in managing environmental soft loan program while 
most of the recipient countries failed or cancelled it?  The above analysis told us the intrinsic 
difficulty in satisfying the conditions and contexts that were pointed out in the section 2. 
Firstly, as for the effectiveness of emission reduction, the recipient countries have not always 
established stringent environmental policies and conducted strict enforcement.  But there can be 
found a clear difference in the extent of packaging them with the environmental soft loan 
program.  The AJDF/B3 and the EPPP I failed to build both technical and financial appraisal 
and ex-post capacity in the handling banks, and could not establish and diffuse technical 
standards, even though the JBIC limited the range of environmental technologies to the one of 
end-of-pipe.  The IPCC also failed in Indonesia but it provided consultant services for potential 
customers so that it might minimize moral hazard and allow firms to invest on cleaner 
production technologies.  The Philippines and Sri Lanka succeeded in building them, though 
the requirement is limited to satisfy EIA and the implementation of the environmental 
management plans in the EIA report. 
Secondly, as for the terms of conditions, Thailand, Indonesia and Sri Lanka faced difficulty 
                                                 
10 It is uncertain whether the DBP can manage the revolving fund in the Environmental 
Infrastructure Support Credit Program II as well as in the first phase, because the program is 
on-going, and the apex bank should channel the repayment to each handling bank for disbursing 
additional environmental lending, the function that any recipient countries had succeeded in up 
until now. 
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in satisfying the condition due to inflation and fluctuation of the interest rate in domestic market.  
It has proven that the range of interest rate is not so wide.  On the one hand, lending rate of the 
environmental soft loan became higher and its comparative advantage to the market loan will be 
lost unless the government takes foreign exchange risk, as occurred in Thailand and China.  On 
the other hand, political and macroeconomic instability worsen the investment climate, which 
shrinks demand for environmental investments, as occurred in Indonesia and Sri Lanka.  The 
Philippines has not suffered from this difficulty, partly because the government took foreign 
exchange risk, and partly because the program was postponed until it had overcome the adverse 
impacts of the Asian economic crisis.  
Thirdly, as for the impact on financial broadening and deepening, the environmental soft loan 
program should be designed so that several competent financial institutions can disburse the 
environmental loans to regions and types of firms that had been excluded from formal financing, 
and the apex bank can monitor and manage the revolving fund to channel the repayment from 
the first borrower to potential ones smoothly.  This condition is so harsh that only Japan and the 
Philippines can satisfy it up until now. 
Why has the Philippines been able to satisfy this condition?  The most important factor is 
the DBP‘s proactive attitude toward policy-based environmental lending.  After the 
restructuring of the government financial institutions and policy-based lending programs, the 
government concentrated policy-based lending programs to a few government banks, including 
the DBP, the Land Bank of the Philippines.  As a policy-based financial institution, it was 
expected to lead the government goal of sustainable economic development rather than to be 
financially independent from the government as in Thailand.  In response, it had implemented 
environmental management plan since 1992.  This constituted the basis for introducing 
environmental due diligence in the operation and for obtaining ISO 14001 certification.  This 
internal initiative has also made it easy for the DBP to enhance competence for environmental 
lending as an organization.  Also, the DBP had traditionally both whole sale and retail functions.  
It had accustomed to disbursing policy-based loans through private financial institutions, though 
the policy impact was evaluated to be small (Tsuji et al [21]).  It was easy to expand the 
program to join private commercial banks because it is consistent with the DBP’s practices. 
In addition, the JBIC and KfW did not stick to end-of-pipe technology or cleaner production 
technology exclusively focused on the core of production process.  Firms tend to prefer waste 
recovery options at ancillary production process when dealing with environmental pollution.  
This is because these options do not affect the core at the production process, are less costly and 
more profitable, and are perceived as less technological risks (Peltier and Ashford [22]).  Firms 
could choose more cost-effective environmental technology when obtaining environmental soft 
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This article tries to find out when and where the environmental soft loan program is justified 
in general, in terms not only of effectiveness in emission reduction and efficiency use of 
resources, but efficiency of resource allocation both in the short and long run.  From the 
theoretical arguments, we found the existence of negative externalities and market failure can 
justifies environmental soft loan program as long as the program can minimize the market 
distortion and moral hazard on the part pf borrowers.  From the case study of the “successful” 
experience in Japan, we showed the following points should be taken in evaluation framework: 
(a) packaging of the soft loan program with stringent environmental regulations and strict 
enforcement, (b) establishment of technical standards and enhancement of handling banks’ 
competence in appraisal, (c) positive real interest rate and comparative advantage of terms of 
conditions compared with ones of the market, (d) impact on financial deepening that outweighs 
the loss from inefficiency in the capital market by offering loans to SMEs through formal 
financial institutions. 
Then we conducted comparative analysis of the environmental soft loan programs in 
Thailand, Indonesia, China, Philippines, and Sri Lanka.  We found that only the Philippines has 
satisfied with the above three conditions, especially in the EISCP II.  Besides avoiding adverse 
impact of the Asian Economic Crisis, the program has encouraged the DBP to lead the 
environmental initiatives and has enhanced capacity of both the DBP and the industrial 
association to establish and diffuse technical standards. 
However, the environmental soft loan may ensure only the minimum level of environmental 
requirements in the Philippines, because it was just integrated into ECC, on which both the 
government and the DBP exclusively focus.  This implies that it may not have significant 
impact on emission reduction of the existing sources in the Philippines.  It is a future challenge 
to clarify whether the environmental soft loan program will still be effective and efficient way of 
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Table 1 OECF and KfW's Crdit Line for Environment in Asian Countries
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1996 Industrial Pollution Control I ODA Grants 100 532
Development Bank of the
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ODA Loans 62 41,566
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Development Bank of the
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National Development
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Table 2 Difference in lending interest rate between JBIC's loan and the market








OECF 1992 Environmental SoftLoan AJDF/B3
Official discount
rate (10% in 15.0% 23.0%
KfW 2000 Industrial PollutionControl Credit 9-14% 16.5-18.5% 14-16.5%
Thailand OECF 1993 EnvironmentalProtection Promotion 10-10.75% 16.0% 6.5-7%
China OECF 1996 Environmental PackageLoan 1-3% 10.1% -
KfW 1996 Industrial PollutionControl I
2% lower than
market rate













KfW 1998 NDB Small LoanProgramme II 15.0% 13.2%
OECF 1998 EnvironmentallyFriendly Solutions Fund 8.5% 15.0% 10.3%
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. various years;
     JBIC (2001), Sasaki et al (2001), Tsubosato (2006).
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Indonesia
